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ABSTRACT Smartphones are quickly moving toward complementing or even replacing traditional car
keys. We advocate a role-based access control policy mixed with attributes that facilitates access to various
functionalities of vehicular on-board units from smartphones. We use a rights-based access control policy
for in-vehicle functionalities similar to the case of a file allocation table of a contemporary OS, in which
read, write or execute operations can be performed over various vehicle functions. Further, to assure
the appropriate security, we develop a protocol suite using identity-based cryptography and we rely on
group signatures which preserve the anonymity of group members thus assuring privacy and traceability.
To prove the feasibility of our approach, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation with modern
smartphones, aftermarket Android head-units and test computational feasibility on a real-world in-vehicle
controller. Our implementation relies on state-of-the-art cryptography, including traditional building blocks
and more modern pairing-friendly curves, which facilitate the adoption of group signatures and identity-
based cryptography in automotive-based scenarios.
INDEX TERMS Access control, Authentication, Automotive applications, Cryptography, Smart devices
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The generous interface of modern smartphones and their
ubiquitousness opens road for adding access control to vari-
ous car functionalities as well as for remote configuration and
rights delegation. In contrast, classical radio-frequency (RF)
and/or mechanical vehicle keys are rigid and lack in terms
of flexibility and functionalities. Perhaps surprising, despite
their simplicity, classical RF keys have shown numerous
flaws that led to a plethora of reported attacks targeting
weaknesses in regular RF keys [59], [63], open-source immo-
bilizer specifications [53], or passive keyless entry systems
[24], [26], [64]. So it seems that the security of traditional
car keys is lacking in many respects. The causes are numer-
ous, including poor selection of cryptographic algorithms or
poor randomness, etc. This merely complements a landscape
which became familiar to us in the recent years as cars are
unsatisfactory prepared in terms of security, e.g., [39], [15],
[45].
By using smartphones, specific applications can be tar-
geted and the interface customized to gain access to virtually
any device or component from the car. Moreover, rights
delegation can address complex scenarios due to increased
connectivity at a global scale. Consequently, replacing tradi-
tional keys with smartphones appears like a natural step in
achieving increased usability and an improved user experi-
ence. This is in fact proved both by many research works
(which we separately address in the related work section) but
also by recent industry efforts such as the Car Connectivity
Consortium which drives a global initiative of top players
from the automotive domain for car-to-smartphone connec-
tivity1. To place the current research into context, Figure 1
provides a depiction of the interface that we implemented
in PRESTvO. Some car functionalities are outlined and four
user roles are displayed: car owner, driver, passenger and a
1https://carconnectivity.org/
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FIGURE 1. PRESTvO user interface.
TABLE 1. An example of role access rights
O
w
ne
r
D
ri
ve
r
Te
ch
ni
ci
an
C
hi
ld
O
cu
pp
an
t
Va
le
t
Pa
ss
en
ge
r
Start Engine −−− −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Open Trunk −−e −−e −−e −−− −−− −−e
Open Doors −−e −−e −−e −−e −−e −−e
Limit speed rw− rw− −−− −−− −−− −−−
Fuel Level r−− r−− r−− −−− r−− −−−
Diagnosis −−e −−e −−e −−− −−− −−−
SW Update −−− −−− −−e −−− −−− −−−
Park car −−− −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Home −−e −−e −−e −−− −−− −−−
Alarm −−e −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Start A/C −−e −−e −−e −−− −−e −−e
Defrost −−e −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Mirrors −−e −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Lights −−e −−e −−e −−− −−e −−−
Play music −−e −−e −−e −−e −−e −−e
Limit volume rw− rw− rw− −−− −−− −−−
Trip Computer rw− rw− r−− −−− −−− −−−
technician role. Table 1 summarizes role rights which are
marked in a similar fashion to access rights over files in a
modern operating system.
However, replacing traditional keys with smartphones
comes with additional security and privacy challenges. For
example, smartphones will have to pair with the car over a
wireless communication interface such as Wifi, Bluetooth or
NFC. But all these interfaces have been commonly found
vulnerable, e.g., key reinstallation attacks on the WPA2 have
attracted much attention a few years ago [58], some vulner-
abilities of NFC-based payments were shown by [28], and
quite long list of potential exploits on Bluetooth can be found
in [1], [33] with more recent results showing attacks on Blue-
tooth elliptical curve based pairings in [9]. Such vulnerabili-
ties can be overcome only at the application layer by proper
protocol designs based on specific cryptographic function-
alities. This is precisely our intention here in PRESTvO,
to design, implement and test a secure protocol for gaining
access from a smartphone to a car via an existing wireless
interface, e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth. The protection mechanism
will not be limited to the communication channel, it will
also have to address on-device adversaries, such as malicious
manufacturers, that may want to retrieve information from
the vehicle in order to track the users. Recent incidents
showed that major companies can be involved in privacy
leakages either by their own consent or due to data breaches
[35], [65]. Consequently, we focus both on the security of
the communication channel and on the privacy of the users
which is assured by the more demanding cryptographic group
signatures. In this way, as the identity remains hidden behind
the group key, the car should be unable to log any specific
information about the person which gained access to the car.
In what follows we briefly discuss the cryptographic toolset
that enables us to reach the desired security and privacy goals.
Cryptographic building blocks. In principle, cryptography
offers a comprehensive set of functions, i.e., cryptographic
primitives, that can assure various security objectives , e.g.,
authenticity, confidentiality, etc. Besides regular symmetric
and asymmetric primitives, i.e., public-key encryptions and
digital signatures, more recent advances set room for more
exotic cryptographic functionalities. These include identity-
based cryptography where the identity of a user can be
used to derive his public key or group signatures where the
identity of a user can be preserved anonymously under the
public-key of a group (still allowing the group manager to
trace the user if a dispute arises). There is no question that
these cryptographic functionalities will be sooner or later
adopted by the industry. The AUTOSAR standard already
defines interfaces for regular cryptographic building blocks
in the automotive domain [4], [5]. Identity-based signatures
are part of an ISO standard [36] published long ago and
it targets embedded devices such as smartcards. There are
numerous research works that advocate for the use of these
cryptographic building blocks for car access-control, these
are summarized in Table 2 and will be discussed in the
related work section. However, the heterogeneity of the ad-
dressed environment, where smartphones interact with in-
vehicle units, raises performance concerns. Our work builds
upon various cryptographic building blocks (identity-based
signatures, group signatures, etc.) and besides designing a
car access protocol we try to bring answers regarding the
feasibility of deploying this solution both on mobile devices
and on in-vehicle components.
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FIGURE 2. User handling the PRESTvO application to colect the car VIN
number, i.e., the identity of the car
Garnering advantages from group and identity-based sig-
natures. While some of the cryptographic building blocks
that we use are more demanding, e.g., group signatures,
there are clear benefits behind using them in this car access
scenario. By using group signatures, the car will be aware
which role is accessing the car, i.e., owner, driver, passenger
or technician, but will have no information on the entity that
instantiated the specific role. That is, there may be multiple
drivers, passenger, technicians and even car ownership may
be shared, while the car (and implicitly the car manufacturer)
will be unable to log information regarding the exact user (it
is only the role which stays visible). With specific function-
alities of group signatures, which are later discussed in the
protocol design section, the exact user can still be traced by
the group manager in case when a dispute arises. Our design
emphasizes on the right of ownership and thus we let the car
owner to be in possession of the group manager secret key
(other deployments may choose to attribute this functionality
to a trusted authority). While traditional signatures may pre-
serve the anonymity of the users by using pseudonyms in the
certificates, it is still possible to separate between users based
on their distinct public keys and additional information, e.g.,
driving time and location leakages, may be corroborated for
the de-anonymization of the user behind the pseudonym.
Group signatures provide better privacy guarantees in this
respect.
The use of identity-based signatures will make public-keys
far easier and more intuitively to manage. For example, we
show in Figure 2 a user attempting to collect the identity of
a car from its VIN number that is located on the driver’s
side where the windshield meets the dashboard (this is not
the only location but it is the most common for cars). To
recognize the text from the VIN number, we used the text
detection package from the Mobile Vision API2 which pro-
vides a framework for objects identification in photos and
video. The text of the VIN number from the dashboard was
collected with almost 100% accuracy showing that there are
no technological shortcomings in this respect (provided that
the dashboard is clean and the phone camera properly pointed
to the VIN). Clearly, other elements, such as the license
plate, can be used for the same purpose. The VIN however
is immutable and will remain forever associated with a car,
while the license plate can change. For example, in many
countries new cars have temporary license plates until they
are sold to the first customer. Thus the VIN number provides
a more reliable identity for the car. This functionality may
prove particularly useful in car-rental scenarios as well as for
companies which share several cars between their employees.
System design goals. We now briefly discuss the design
goals of our proposal. Figure 3 gives an overview of the ad-
dressed system. A user requests a particular functionality of
the car which is to be executed by some in-vehicle electronic
control unit (ECU). Access is mediated by PRESTvO. First
an authentication service is called which verifies the identity
of the user and the role he invoked. If the identity and roles
are verified, the role along with the request is passed to the
access control service which in turn verifies authorization for
the particular request and returns the access decision. In case
of a positive decision, the request is passed to the car which
in turn responds according to the request, i.e., by executing
the particular functionality and sending a response message.
The user receives a response from PRESTvO which may
be negative if his function request could not be approved
or a confirmation otherwise. We design the protocol behind
PRESTvO with both security and privacy in mind and also
without forgetting that we address functionalities inside a car
and target real-world automotive-grade embedded devices.
The following summarizes the goals of our work:
1) secure access control to all vehicle functionalities medi-
ated by the use of smartphones is the prime intention of
our work,
2) a flexible access control policy determined by roles and
attributes falling middle of the road between RBAC and
attribute-based access control (ABAC) which seems the
best option due to the variety of car-usage scenarios,
3) rights delegation and also rights revocation directly from
the smartphone is a natural functionality,
2https://developers.google.com/vision
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FIGURE 3. PRESTvO system design
4) user privacy, by which we keep the identity of the user
anonymous to the car and manufacturers, is enforced by
the use of group signatures which hide the identity of a
specific user inside a group,
5) user traceability in case when a dispute arises is a
mandatory procedure due to legal implications, e.g.,
the car may be involved in an accident and it becomes
necessary to be able to trace a particular user,
6) flexible use of wireless interfaces WiFi, Bluetooth and
NFC according to existing support on the hardware that
we used (smartphones and vehicle head-units),
7) comprehensive performance tests on real-world auto-
motive grade controllers are a must in order to prove
that implementation is realistic with respect to state-of-
the-art in automotive on-board units.
A. RELATED WORK
Related work on vehicle access control and rights delegation
is extensive. While only a limited amount of research papers
have been focusing on traditional car immobilizers, e.g., [42],
there is quite a large number of recent works that address
the use of smartphones for accessing vehicle functionalities.
In what follows, we give a brief overview of the existing
proposals and summarize the most relevant of them in Table
2. We also point out in the table whether the work uses
any enhanced cryptographic capabilities, e.g., identity-based
signatures, group signature, etc., besides the regular sym-
metric/asymmetric primitives which are present in all of the
works.
The use of smartphones for access-control systems inside
buildings and as replacement of traditional physical keys has
been explored as early as the works of [6], [7].
In [12] a full platform for car access and rights delegation
from an Android smartphone is presented. The security is
reinforced by the use of a smart-card and the authors present
both a proof-of-concept implementation and strong security
arguments by model checking with ProVerif. A hierarchical
car sharing architecture is proposed in [62]. The authors
consider only a simplified hierarchy with 3 levels: a key
generation center, the owner or the rental company and the
end-user. A proof of concept implementation is presented
on an Android Nexus 5 smartphone, the protocol relies on
identity based encryptions and signatures. The authors of
[20] propose a generic smartphone-based NFC access con-
trol system that allows access rights delegation. The access
control system is based on a multi-level smartphone security
architecture designed to provide trusted execution and stor-
age environments. Formal security analysis as well as a proof
of concept implementation on a simplified system model are
provided. Several NFC-based use cases for the automotive
environment are also described and implemented in [50].
Another secure access control system for car sharing is
proposed in [19]. It employs two-factor authentication pro-
vided by an RFID token and a soft token to enable access
to offline cars. The proposed instantiation uses a secure exe-
cution platform that can be implemented on devices such as
smartcards or smartwatches. Another approach for car shar-
ing is proposed in [52]. The paper presents a decentralised
protocol that provides both security and privacy allowing
owners to share their cars. Protocol analysis and a proof-of
concept implementation are also considered.
Other works that use smartphones for gaining access to
vehicles are [2] and [11]. The Green Move project described
in [2] is a vehicle sharing system. In this project, the vehicles
are equipped with Green e-box devices, which communicate
with a smartphone via Bluetooth and with the cloud (Green
Move Center) via HTTP. Using the smartphone application,
the user retrieves the valid electronic key from the Green
Move Center, which contains an encrypted ticket, the start
time of reservation as well as all the information to identify
the car. The encrypted ticket is used to lock/unlock the doors.
In [11], the Terminal Mode technology is described. This
technology integrates the smartphone into the car head unit.
In this scenario, the input and output functions are the re-
sponsibilities of the car head unit, while the smartphone acts
as the application platform. New functionalities can be added
4 VOLUME , 2020
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TABLE 2. Summary of some existing proposals for car keys with enhanced capabilities (in chronological order by year of publication)
Paper Main Concept Platform for Key Deployment Comm.
intrf.
Other
cryptographic rq.
Car
AC
Rights
deleg.
[20] Access control rights delegation with trusted
execution environment on Android
Nexus S (Android 2.3.3 patched with Trust-
Droid security extensions)
NFC – – X
[12] Car access and rights delegation from an
Android smartphone, security reinforced by
smart-card
Samsung Galaxy S3, Arduino Uno (8-bit
microcontroller for car immobilizer)
NFC – X X
[54] Secure vehicle-to-cloud communications
based (uses OAuth & HSM)
– NFC – X –
[37] Rights Management with NFC Smartphones
and Electronic ID Cards
Blackberry Bold 990 NFC – – –
[32] Pairing cars and smartphones by OOB (out-
of-band) channels: light and sound (aug-
mented by the Encrypted Key Exchange pro-
tocol, Diffie-Hellman version)
Motorola Droid 1, Android 2.2.3 (Froyo) BT – X –
[52] Car sharing functionality with secure multi-
party computation
Intel Core i7, 2.6 Ghz CPU, 8GBof RAM NFC,
BT
Secure multi-party
computation
X X
[19] Car sharing by short-range wireless commu-
nication (RFID, NFC, BLE) with two-factor
authentication
Samsung S4 (Android 5.0), Google Nexus
5 Android 5.1 (Lollipop), + Giesecke &
Devrient Mobile Security Card (MSC) with
DESFire applet, contactless Mifare DESFire
EV1 smartcard, Samsung Galaxy Gear SM-
V700 smartwatch (Android 4.2)
NFC,
BLE
– X –
[62] Car sharing in a hierarchical system between
KGC (key generation center), owner/rental
company, user
Android Nexus 5 NFC Identity-based
encryption and
signatures
X X
[29] Rights delegation to a car from a low-cost
embedded platform by using only symmetric
crypto-primitives
MSP430 (16-bit microcontroller from Texas
Instruments for key), Freescale S12 (as car
immobilizer)
RF – X X
Our
Work
Car access and rights delegation, preserving
anonymity by using group signatures, elimi-
nating PKI by using identity-based cryptog-
raphy
LG, Samsung J5, ERISIN & PNI car head-
units, Infienon TC297 (for car immobilizer)
NFC,
BT,
WiFi
Identity-based
signatures, group
signatures
X X
to the car head unit by easily upgrading the smartphone.
Some works are focused on cost-efficient solutions. The
implementation of a dedicated device for car-rights dele-
gation on low-cost MSP430 microcontrollers from Texas
Instruments is discussed in [29]. A keyless car access system
using RFID cards (e-driver licenses) is proposed in [34]. In
this scenario, each driver license is assigned to the driver’s
identity based on an RFID card using a serial number stored
in the cloud database. If the serial number exists in the
database, the driver can use the car and the owner knows
who is driving the car based on information provided by a
smartphone application.
Pairing mobile devices with cars has also been targeted.
A secure pairing between mobile devices and vehicles based
on out-of-band (OOB) channels is proposed in [32]. The
authors present several key agreement protocols using light
and sound as OOB channels. Protocol analysis with AVISPA
[3] as well as implementations are also provided.
Privacy concerns for smartphone applications in the auto-
motive domain have been also addressed for pay-by-phone
parking systems [27] or GPS tracking [43].
B. SELECTING SETUP COMPONENTS
Table 3 provides a summary of the devices that we used in
our setup. In what follows, we discuss these in detail.
Android head units and smartphones. For our experimen-
tal setup we acquired two Android head-units with similar
computational/communication capabilities. The first of them
from ERISIN was designed to replace SEAT and VW head
units. The head unit provides a 9-inch capacitive display
with 1024 x 600 resolution running the Android 7.1 Nougat
OS. The CPU it uses is an Allwinner Quad-Core T3 SoC
(Quad-core Cortex A7, 1.63GHz and Mali400 MP2 GPU),
2GB RAM and 16GB internal memory. The storage can
be increased by using microSD cards or USB connected
memory devices. The T3 SoC integrates a high number of
peripherals providing support for a multitude of standards:
USB, SATA, UART, TWI, SPI, EMAC, GMAC, PS2. The
unit offers wireless Bluetooth and Wi-FI 802.11b/g/n con-
nectivity. In addition it integrates: GPS, AM/FM radio tuner,
RDS, DAB/DAB+ and CAN communication. Also this unit
includes an USB connected rear view camera. Diagnostics
information can be retrieved by using the included Blue-
tooth OBD2 Module. The second aftermarket head unit, PNI
A8020 HD, is a generic replacement head unit. This is a
lower cost version but is essentially deployed on almost the
same hardware. It comes with a 7-inch capacitive display and
1GB RAM but it uses the same Allwinner Quad-Core T3 SoC
along with the same level of connectivity.
Vehicle on-board units. The on-board unit functionality
can be built either as a stand-alone unit or as part of an ECU
responsible for several other functionalities related to the
body domain. We advocate for the latter since car access con-
trol is traditionally implemented as part of the body control
VOLUME , 2020 5
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TABLE 3. Devices from our experiments: smartphones, head-units and in-vehicle control unit
Device Android CPU Memory WiFi BT
LG Optimus P700 4.0.3 1.0 GHz Cortex-A5 4 GB (2.4 GB user
available) 512 MB RAM
Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n, Wi-Fi
Direct, hotspot, DLNA
3.0, A2DP
Samsung J5 5.1.1 Quad-core 1.2 GHz Cortex-A53 8 GB, 1.5 GB RAM Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n, Wi-Fi
Direct, hotspot
4.1, A2DP
Samsung S5 6.0.1 Quad-core 2.5 GHz Krait 450 16 GB, 2 GB RAM Wi-Fi 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac,
dual-band, Wi-Fi Direct,
hotspot
4.0, A2DP, EDR,
LE, aptX
Samsung S7 6.0.1 Octa-core (4x2.3 GHz Mon-
goose & 4x1.6 GHz Cortex-A53)
32 GB, 4 GB RAM Wi-Fi 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac,
dual-band, Wi-Fi Direct,
hotspot
4.2, A2DP, LE,
aptX
Head-unit PNI/ERISIN 7.1.1 Quad-core 1.63 GHz Cortex A7 12 GB, 1/2 GB RAM Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n,
hotspot,
4.0, A2DP,
BR/EDR
Infineon TC N/A Triple Core 300MHz TriCore 8 MB Flash, 728KB RAM N/A N/A
module (BCM). The protocols implemented by the car access
functionality are based on computationally intensive public
key cryptography. Moreover, an embedded platform suitable
to serve as the on-board unit as well as to implement other
vehicle body functions should be able to perform all its desig-
nated functionalities in a timely manner. This calls for the use
of a high performance automotive grade embedded platform
capable of performing public key cryptography operations.
We selected the TC297, an Infineon Aurix microcontroller,
which can act in a real car as the BCM with on-board
unit functionality. The multicore architecture of Aurix 32 bit
microcontrollers is built to offer high performance. Covering
automotive communication technologies such as CAN (and
CAN-FD), FlexRay and Ethernet, the TC297 is suitable for
a wide range of automotive applications. Additionally, the
Aurix family introduces a hardware security module which
provides random number generation, AES128 HW accelera-
tion and a trusted execution environment for cryptographic
algorithms. All these features make the TC297 a suitable
candidate for the designated application.
C. SELECTING COMMUNICATION INTERFACES
A short discussion on the three communication interfaces,
i.e., Bluetooth, WiFi and NFC, that we use in our deployment
now follows. While each of them can be used for any of the
protocol components, pros and cons exist. Also, some restric-
tions may occur due to the unavailability of some of them
in existing components. For example, the head units that we
use are not equipped with NFC readers while their Bluetooth
connectivity allows only for media streaming. Next, we give
a brief overview of these interfaces and how they are used in
our practical implementation.
Bluetooth is a technology for wireless data transfer be-
tween devices for a short range with low power consump-
tion. The maximum packet size that can be transferred on
Bluetooth BR/EDR is 1021 bytes. In the last years, Blue-
tooth technology has been frequently used to communicate
between the user and the car. The main use case is for the
car infotainment system and in-vehicle wearables applica-
tions but also for car access control and maintenance tools.
Bluetooth devices use profiles to specify the features that
are supported and the type of data that can be transmit-
ted/received. The infotainment units used in our work have
four Bluetooth Profiles: Advanced Audio Distribution Pro-
file (A2DP), Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP),
Hands-Free Profile (HFP), and Headset Profile (HSP). These
profiles can be used only for multimedia functionalities. The
smartphones that we used on this work have a richer set
of Bluetooth profiles: Advanced Audio Distribution Profile
(A2DP), Hands-Free Profile (HFP), Headset Profile (HSP),
File Transfer Profile (FTP), Message Access Profile (MAP),
Object Push Profile (OPP), and Phone Book Access Profile
(PBAP). To transfer packets of bytes between two devices,
both devices have to support at least one of the Bluetooth
Profiles that uses the OBEX protocol (Object Exchange).
The Bluetooth profiles that use OBEX are FTP, OPP, and
MAP. Since our infotainment units do not have any Bluetooth
profile with OBEX support, we used Bluetooth only between
smartphones and relied on WiFi for communicating with the
infotainment unit as we discuss next. However, Infotainment
units with OBEX support for Bluetooth exist, so this is not
a technical limitation for our protocol, it is just a small
limitation of our setup.
Wireless networking (Wi-Fi) is a technology for commu-
nication with high speed data transfer. In automotive, Wi-Fi
technology is sometimes used by infotainment systems and
is an essential component for the connecting cars in vehicle-
to-vehicle communication (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) or vehicle to pedestrian communications, etc. A num-
ber of recent works have also focused on the use of WiFi for
phone-to-phone communication inside vehicles, e.g., [51].
Consequently, we consider that deploying part of our pro-
tocol over WiFi is realistic and will benefit from a higher
data rate. In particular, we find that Wi-Fi is specifically
suitable for protocol components that rely on the larger group
signatures.
Near-field communication (NFC) is a set of communi-
cation protocols which offers the possibility to establish a
short-range communication between two electronic devices.
NFC relies on RFID, having the operating frequency at 13.56
MHz and the bit rate between 106 kbit/s and 424 kbit/s. The
communication range is up to 20 cm. A full NFC capable
6 VOLUME , 2020
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device can operate in one of the following three modes: card
emulation, reader/writer and peer-to-peer. The first mode per-
mits a smart NFC-enabled devices to act like smart cards, the
second mode may be used for the reading and writing of NFC
tags and the last mode, peer-to-peer, offers the possibility for
two NFC-enabled smart devices to communicate in an ad-hoc
manner. Each device that participates to the communication
can be either the initiator or the target. A passive target
can be powered by the RF field generated by the initiator.
When compared to Bluetooth, which is also a short-range
communication technology, NFC operates at a much shorter
range and at slower speeds. On the other hand, the power
consumption is an advantage of NFC as it consumes less
power than Bluetooth. Another advantage of NFC is that it
doesn’t require pairing and, from the security point of view, a
shorter communication range may preclude adversaries from
intercepting the communication channel. Still, attacks have
been reported on NFC as well, e.g., [60], [25]. We do use
NFC for sharing access rights between smartphones but still
rely on cryptographic building blocks to assure security.
Brief discussion on connectivity. The specific use-case that
we address, i.e., car access mediated by smartphones, calls
only for short distance connectivity. That is, the range of
Bluetooth and WiFi is generally restricted to 10-100 meters
[61] with possible extensions to around 200 meters for WiFi
when the devices are outdoors. NFC targets different type of
applications and is limited to a few dozen centimeters. This
coverage is of course sufficient for a user that tries to gain
access to the car. Other actions, such as blacklisting identities
or certificate, i.e., certificate revocations, or removing certain
user rights from the car, may be more efficiently performed
remotely. In this case 4G/5G connectivity will be needed.
This type of connectivity is within reach for modern vehicles
and is in fact commonly required for vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) communication. There is a large body of research
works focusing on vehicular ad-hoc networks, routing and
even security and privacy issues for such scenarios, e.g.,
[16], [46], [41]. Our work will focus on Bluetooth and WiFi
communication which are more convenient for the scenario
that we address.
II. DESIGN CONCEPT
In this section we discuss the design concept behind our
proposal. Subsequently, we give precise details on each com-
ponent of the proposed protocol suite.
A. ACCESS CONTROL CONCEPT
We now present the concept behind our access control policy.
The access control procedure is based on role-based access
control (RBAC) to which we add some attributes that are
needed for the roles. Using RBAC seems natural in auto-
motive environments since manufacturers can easily define
specific roles for a car, e.g., driver, passenger, child occupant,
etc., and each role may offer specific access rights to users.
Using Discretionary Access Control (DAC) or alternatively
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) are also viable alterna-
tives but associating rights to specific roles seems the more
natural approach for our car access control scenario. Roles
will also enforce the anonymity of each actor carrying the
role under group signatures. RBAC is well understood and
standard specifications exist, e.g., [23]. Numerous extensions
of it have also been discussed, e.g., using attributes [40],
location-aware policies [17], public-key certificates [13], or
trust [14], etc. This opens road for many future applications
and while the basic RBAC may be somewhat rigid it can be
easily augmented and made more flexible.
A graphical depiction of the proposed access control
model is suggested in Figure 4. Following at least in part
accepted/standardized definitions from [23], we briefly sum-
marize core elements:
1) Users can either be individuals or entities instantiated by
software agents, however, in the protocol descriptions
that follow, we generally assume that users are persons
requesting a particular action from the car,
2) Role represents the role played by an entity (an individ-
ual or some software agent). Roles include car owners,
drivers, technicians, child occupants, etc., which are
all played by users. Other roles such as the car rental
company or the manufacturer may be played by soft-
ware agents that delegate rights over the car or execute
various tasks, e.g., a software update, etc.,
3) Attributes are characteristics associated to a user, they
include: time, location, driver license, age, etc. For ex-
ample, a technician may perform a particular update or
access to a component only if he is in the range of a par-
ticular location (e.g., the authorized garage). Attributes
are either numerical or boolean, each attribute can be
set to⊥ when a particular attribute is not applicable to a
particular user or in a particular scenario. For example,
it may be irrelevant whether a technician has or not a
driving license or sometimes location information may
be unavailable while certain rights should be executed
on the car.
4) Objects constitute the car functionalities intuitively
viewed by us as files that may be classified into macro-
objects intuitively viewed by us as folders. Macro-
objects are the car functional domains related to engine,
chassis, body and infotainment. Objects are the associ-
ated functionalities, e.g., adjusts seats or lights, use the
infotainment unit, etc. To simplify our model in Figure
4 we have only considered macro-objects associated
to four functional domains: engine, chassis, body and
infotainment. This instantiation may be easily extended,
we present what it seems sufficient for most scenarios
that we could imagine.
5) Actions are the activities that can be performed on an
object. We view permissions over car functionalities
similar to traditional Unix-like systems. Similarly to
Unix files and folders we consider three types of actions:
read simply lists the content that is as available, write
modifies specific values and execute is the ability to
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FIGURE 4. Overview of role-based access control in PRESTvO
run the particular functionality. That is ACTIONS =
{w, r, e} where each action is instantiated by a binary
flag. The read permission allows a user read data, for
example the user may read the fuel level, the mileage
counter or the status of many other subsystems in the
car. Write permissions are necessary to set specific
values, for example setting the date and time, the cruise
speed or resetting the trip computer. Execution rights,
are required by specific programs, such as a movie
player or by a software update. A technician may be
entitled to make a software update, but not to play
movies from Netflix, while for the passenger it’s the
reverse.
6) Permissions are the authorization given to a role
over an object which makes PERMISSIONS =
2OBJECTS×ACTIONS. For example, a potential car buyer
may be authorized to list all functionalities in the car
on his mobile phone, but without the possibility to run
them. On the contrary, the manufacturer may be entitled
to update the functionality. For simplicity, in the instan-
tiation from Figure 4 we consider that permissions from
a macro-object propagate identically over the objects
below, but this can be changed according to practical
needs.
Defining roles, persistent and ephemeral delegation. We
consider that roles are predefined by the producer during
the manufacturing process. Subsequently, the car owner is
responsible for assigning the group public keys for each role.
In this way the manufacturer cannot control a car owned by
some individual but it does have control over the rights given
to each role which is necessary to avoid misuse of a particular
service. We consider that the owner of the car assumes a
root role and that the root is the only role allowed to install
public keys in the car. Rights delegation can be persistent or
ephemeral and it can be performed by any actor in a specific
role. As we later present in the experimental results section,
we allow delegation from one smart-phone to another via
NFC, but of course any other interface such as WiFi, Blue-
tooth or even 4G can be used for this purpose. We prefer NFC
due to its short range which makes it harder for an adversary
to eavesdrop on the channel (the delegation protocol is secure
nonetheless, so any communication channel can be used).
Ephemeral delegation is designed to be short lived, e.g., a
car that is rent for weeks or days. Persistent delegation is
designed to be long lived and makes role owners indistin-
guishable one from another, e.g., rights delegation to family
of the car owner. It is obvious that the environment inside the
car, e.g., mirror or seat position, does leak some information
about the car occupant but addressing such issues is out of
scope for us. We address privacy only from a protocol design
perspective, i.e., the protocol run should not leak information
about the role player in case of persistent users. Any other
role can make ephemeral delegations of his access rights but
persistent delegation can be done by the root only.
Rights revocation can be done by the root or by the
delegating user. Both persistent and ephemeral users can be
8 VOLUME , 2020
Groza et al.: PRESTvO: PRivacy Enabled Smartphone based access To vehicle On-board units
revoked. Revocation requires a certificate revocation list that
is maintained in the cloud so the car must have Internet
connectivity, e.g., via 4G. While this is not a complicated
demand for modern cars, it may be the case that in certain
situations the car does not have such connectivity. In this sit-
uation, rights are to be revoked as soon as the car connects to
the Internet or as soon as they expire based on the attributes.
B. CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
Symmetric primitives. Our protocol makes use of standard
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and symmetric en-
cryption which are instanced by SHA2 and AES in our proof-
of-concept implementation. Besides these, we use more ad-
vanced cryptographic building blocks such as identity-based
signatures and group signatures. We discuss these in more
detail next. While symmetric primitives are present in all
protocol actions along with asymmetric primitives, they play
an exclusive role in the on-the-fly execution procedure which
is designed for fast interaction with the car.
Public-key primitives. Besides the more complex identity-
based and group-based primitives that we discuss next, our
protocol uses regular public-key cryptographic functions.
These are generally used in practice to establish a secure
communication channel between participants by facilitating
the exchange of a secret session key (which is later used
for symmetric encryption). To achieve this, we can rely on
RSA [48] encryption or, for a more compact representation,
on the elliptical curve version of the Diffie-Hellman key-
exchange [18] , i.e., ECDH. Currently, 224-256 bit ECDH
keys are viewed as the security equivalent of 2048-3072
bit RSA keys. While RSA leads to larger keys when com-
pared to the elliptical-curve Diffie-Hellman, these are still
easily manageable by modern smartphones. We later show
in the experimental section that the computational overhead
induced by RSA is of little concern while manipulating keys
of a few thousand bits is even less of a problem for modern
smartphones that have several giga-bytes of RAM.
Identity-based signatures (IBS) provide a more flexible
framework which removes the need for exchanging digital
certificates. The idea of identity-based signature originates
from Shamir [49], for a more comprehensive introduction
we refer the reader to [38]. In our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation, we consider both the original Shamir scheme as
well as the Guillou-Quisquater scheme [30] which is part
of the ISO/IEC 14888-2:2008 standard and is commonly
proposed for use in embedded devices such as smart-cards
[31]. While this scheme is a bit more computational intensive
than the regular RSA, it can be easily handled by modern
Android devices (as we discuss in the experimental section)
and it removes the need for digital certificates. To clarify
the functionalities behind an identity-based signature, we
provide next a generic description for it. For brevity, the
concrete description of the two identity-based schemes is
moved to Appendix A. An identity-based signature scheme
consists of the following four algorithms:
1) Setup(k) is the key setup algorithm which outputs the
master secret key msk and the global parameters pk.
2) KeyDer(msk, I) is the key generation algorithm which
uses the master secret key msk and the identity of the
user I to output the private key of the user.
3) Sign(sk,m) is the signature generation algorithm which
uses the secret key sk on the message m to return the
signature σ.
4) Ver(pk, I,m, σ) takes as input the system global param-
eters pk, the identity of the user I , the message m and
the signature σ and returns true or false accordingly.
Group signatures (GS) are used in order to provide the
anonymity for group members. That is, the receiver of the
signature can verify that it originates from a group member,
but he cannot trace the particular group member. We use the
scheme proposed by Boneh et al. in [10]. Technical details
are dense, we stick to a brief formalism that help us clarify
the operations required by the group signature. The group
signature is a collection of three algorithms:
1) Gen(n) is the key generation algorithm that takes the
number of group users n and returns the group se-
cret master key gmsk, the group public key gpk and
the vector containing the group secret keys gsk =
{gsk1, gsk2, ..., gskn} that will be distributed to the
group users,
2) Sign(gpk, gski,m) is the signature algorithm that takes
as input the group public key gpk, the secret key of the
signer gski and a message m then returns the signature
σ,
3) Ver(gpk,m, σ) is the verification algorithm which takes
as input the group public-key gpk, the message m and
the signature σ and returns true if the signature is correct
otherwise it returns ⊥,
4) Trace(gpk, gmsk,m, σ) is the tracing algorithm that can
determine the signer based on the group secret key
gmsk, the group public-key gpk, the message m and the
signature σ.
Additionally, the group signature has mechanisms for re-
voking the keys. This will require updating the public key
of the group. For simplicity, we skip formalism for this
procedure.
As a general rule we assume that all signatures are time-
stamped, i.e, they contain a timestamp and a loose time
synchronization exists between all devices in the scheme.
Such a requirement is in fact ubiquitous in Internet security
and should not raise additional concerns for our scenario.
To avoid overloading our notations, the timestamp is not
explicitly mentioned in the signatures.
C. PROTOCOL STEPS
The procedures required by the protocol are discussed next.
Car setup at the manufacturer. The procedures for setting
up the car and installing the root (which is the owner) are
graphically depicted in Figure 5. We consider that these steps
are done in a secure environment. Generally, this should be
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II.2. Authorize seller installation data by signing data
Sold Car
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III) Upload roles
III.1. Request from owner to car for role key setup
III.2. Challenge received from car
Car
III.3. Send group public key for a role
III.4. Confirm group public key instalation
I) Setup (by manufacturer)
1. Man Car: Man,CarID, skcar ,Role× Atr × Rights}
II) Set root (by seller & manufacturer)
1. Sel Man: msel = {Sel,Man,CarID}, ssel = IdSig(sksel ,msel )
2. Man Sel: mmnf = {act:sel, Sel,CarID},
smnf = IdSig(skmnf ,mmnf )
3. Own Sel: owner data,mown = {PsO,Tstart ,∞}
4. Sel Car: mown , ssel = IdSig(sksel ,mown ),mmnf , smnf
III) Upload role public keys (by root only)
1. Own→ Car: m′own = {Nown ,Own,CarID},
s′own = IdSig(skown ,m′own )
2. Car→ Own: m′car = {Nown ,Ncar}, s′car = IdSig(skcar ,m′car )
3. Own→ Car: m′′own = {Nown ,Ncar ,Role, gpk,Tstart ,∞},
s′′own = IdSig(skown ,mown )
4. Car→ Own: m′′car = {act:conf,m′′own}, s′′car = IdSig(skcar ,m′′car )
FIGURE 5. Protocol procedures for car setup and group key upload
the case since if the production environment is insecure then
the software on the ECUs may already be altered which may
have more disastrous consequences. Still, if this is not the
case, secure channels can be introduced during setup but
this is out-of-scope for our work. We assume that during
production, the manufacturer installs the secret key of the
Owner
IV) Persistent/Ephemeral Delegation 
Delegate
Request rights
Sign and send delegation
Confirm rights receive
IV) Persistent or ephemeral delegation, i.e., Usr ∈ {Del, D˜el}
1. Usr→ Own: m′usr = {PsU,Role,Atr,Tstart ,Tstop},
m′′usr = {pkusr,Nusr}, susr = IdSig(skusr,m′usr,m′′usr)
2. Own→ Usr: m′own = {Nown ,Nusr, {atk}Kses , bsusrc64},
s′own = GrSig(skown ,m′own )
atk =
{
sk[Role] if Usr = Del
s′′own = GrSig(skown ,m′usr) if Usr = D˜el
3. Usr→ Own: m′′′usr = IdSig(skusr, {m′usr,m′own})
4. Own→ Usr: m′′own = {Kses}pkusr
FIGURE 6. Protocol procedures for persistent and ephemeral rights
delegation
car, i.e., skcar , inside each car. Each car also has a unique
identifier CarID and the manufacturer is also responsible
for installing the roles and rights which are expressed as a
vector product Role×Rights. Since we rely on identity-based
signatures, all public keys will be derived by the car from the
identities of the principals with which it interacts. Any other
public parameters related to the identity-based cryptographic
schemes will be installed in the car at this stage, i.e., step 1.
Setting the root owner during car purchase. The manu-
facturer is also responsible for giving rights to the seller
as expressed in Protocol II from Figure 5. This hap-
pens by simply signing an installation message contain-
ing the identity of the seller and the identity of the car,
i.e., mmnf = {act:sel,Sel,CarID}. Both the request of
the seller and the confirmation from the manufacturer
are signed using an identity-based scheme, i.e., ssel =
IdSig(sksel ,msel), smnf = IdSig(skmnf ,mmnf ). When the
car is purchased, the owner first presents the owner data
(these are physical credentials as a passport or identification
card, etc.). Due to legal issues it does not seem viable to
hide driver’s personal information from the seller, thus the
owner has to present his physical credentials in some way.
We assume that the seller is trustworthy and keeps the confi-
dentiality of the new owner. The owner choses and presents
a pseudonym PsO and a public key PkO and fixes the start
of the contract as Tstart . The life-time of the purchasing
contract is set to∞ which seems a natural choice but can be
changed according to practical needs. We use pseudonyms to
assure driver’s privacy in front of the car manufacturer. The
seller Sel verifies the legal information and if all the criteria
are met, it installs the owner data inside the car by sending
the owner request message mown with its signature ssel . For
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simplicity we also included here the messages for setting the
identity of the seller inside the car, i.e.,mmnf , smnf , but these
can be set as well at some previous stage. We assume that the
seller installs the data received from the manufacturer in a
secure manner inside the car (the secure channel is suggested
by the double arrow). If the setup needs to be done via an
insecure port, such as OBD, we assume that this is done in a
secure environment, e.g., an authorized garage.
Setting group public keys. This procedure is graphically
suggested in Protocol III from Figure 5. The owner is the
only entity entitled to add group public keys. He starts a
challenge-response interaction with the car by sending a
message with a nonce Nown , his identity Own and the car
CarID. This message is signed with an identity-based scheme
as s′own = IdSig(skown ,m
′
own). The car replies with a
message containing its own nonce Ncar and this message
is as well signed as s′car = IdSig(skcar ,m
′
car ). The owner
responds in m′′own by including both the nonce that he sent
and the one received from the car, the message also contains
the name of the role Role and the group public-key gpk along
with start time Tstart and validity period (we consider that
validity is indefinite ∞ since the roles are persistent but
this can be changed according to specific needs). The car
confirms that the group public-key of the role was installed
by signing message m′′own and a confirmation tag act:conf.
Rights delegation scenario. Both the persistent and
ephemeral rights delegation procedures are suggested in Fig-
ure 6, i.e., Usr ∈ {Del, D˜el}. The distinction between the
two cases is in step 2 where the content of the authentication
token atk is different between the two. A persistent user
will receive a group public key while ephemeral users will
receive a signed proof of their execution rights. For the later
case, the delegation holds for a specified amount of time
between Tstart and Tstop . We now describe the rest of the
protocol which is identical regardless of the case. The user
Usr makes a request to the owner by sending his pseudonym
PsU, an ephemeral public-key pkusr, a nonce Nusr and the
role Role and attributes Atr for which he requests the rights.
The message is signed by the user with an identity-based
signature, i.e., susr = IdSig(skusr,musr). The owner replies
with a message containing a nonce Nown , the encrypted
authentication token {atk}Kses and a truncated value from
the signature of the previous message, i.e., bsusrc64. The
message also contains the signature of the owner which
is a group signature for the group that he is part of, i.e.,
sown = GrSig(skown ,mown). The reason for encrypting
the authentication token and not yet disclosing the key is
for the confirmation that the token was received in the next
step. Otherwise, a delegated user may claim that he did not
receive the token. In the next step the user confirms this
with an identity-based signature on both previous messages,
i.e., IdSig(skusr, {m′usr,m′own}). Now the owner discloses the
session key Kses in an encrypted manner such that only the
user (which has the ephemeral public-key) can decrypt in
the last message {Kses}pkusr . The authentication token will
be used in the next procedure for executing functionalities on
the car. The ephemeral public-key pkusr can be a regular RSA
public-key or, if a more compact representation is desired,
an elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman session key, i.e., the scalar
multiplication of an elliptical curve point aP . For the later
case, the owner will reply in the last message with the
corresponding key share, i.e., bP and the session key Kses
is extracted from the common Diffie-Hellman key abP . In
the experimental section we show the differences in terms of
computational costs, but both the Diffie-Hellman and RSA
operations are in the order of dozen milliseconds which is
affordable for modern Android devices.
Execute functionality. Procedures for triggering the execu-
tion of a functionality inside the car are graphically suggested
in Figure 7. The execute scenario calls for two distinct
procedures that achieve the same goal. The first version relies
on asymmetric primitives while the second (on-the-fly) relies
on a session key and symmetric primitives alone. Obviously,
the first procedure is more expensive and we assume that
once a session key is established, only the second (faster)
procedure is to be invoked. First, the user playing either a
persistent or ephemeral user, i.e., Usr ∈ {Del, D˜el}, sends a
message m′usr presenting his role and attributes along with a
nonce Nusr to assure freshness. This message comes along
with signature s′usr which is either a group signature (in
case of persistent users) or an identity-based signature (in
case of ephemeral users). For the later case, the user will
also present the credentials based on which he acquired his
rights from the owner, i.e., s′′,ivown ,m
′,iv
usr (these were received
during the delegation procedure). The car replies as challenge
with an ephemeral public-key pkcar , a nonce Ncar , a session
identifier SID included in mcar . These are signed by the car
with an identity-based signature and presented as scar . The
messagemcar also includes a 64 bit truncation of the original
signature from the user, i.e, bsusrc64. Now the user generates
a session key Kses which is encrypted with the ephemeral
public-key pkcar . The user presents the desired action on the
car as an encrypted message, i.e., {act:exec[i], bscarc64}Kses
(note that this message also includes the last 64 bits of the
car signature, i.e., bscarc64). The message is accompanied
by a regular MAC, i.e, s′′usr, which is performed with the
session key Kses . Similar to the previous protocol fragment,
the ephemeral public-key pkcar can be a regular RSA public-
key or a more compact Diffie-Hellman session key. In the
later case pkcar is replaced by aP and in the last message
{Kses}pkcar is replaced by bP from which the common
session key abP is extracted.
For the on-the-fly version of the protocol, the signatures
are replaced with symmetric key Message Authentication
Codes (MACs). The session identifier SID links the on-
the-fly execution with the session key Kses from the pre-
vious procedure (the life-time of this session key can be
hours, or days, depending on the practical circumstances).
The user presents his request act:exec[i] encrypted with
the session key Kses and authenticated with a MAC, i.e.,
s′usr = MAC(Kses ,musr). The car replies with a nonce Ncar
and this message along with the truncated value of s′usr is also
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User
Confirm and reply with challenge
VIa,b) Execute and execute on-the-fly
Request action from car and sign or authenticate request
Response  to challenge
Car
V) Execute (by persistent or ephemeral role, i.e., Usr ∈ {Del, D˜el})
1. Usr→ Car: m′usr = {Nusr,Role,Atr},
s′usr =
{
GrSig(gsk[usr],musr) if Usr = Del
IdSig(sk[usr],musr), s
′′,iv
own ,m
′,iv
usr if Usr = D˜el
2. Car→ Usr: mcar = {pkcar ,Ncar , SID, bs′usrc64},
scar = IdSig(skcar ,mcar )
3. Usr→ Car: m′′usr = {{Kses}pkcar , {act:exec[i], bscar c64}Kses },
s′′usr = MAC(Kses ,m′′usr)
VI) Execute on-the-fly (by session key)
1. Usr→ Car: musr = {SID, {act:exec[i]}Kses },
s′usr = MAC(Kses ,musr)
2. Car→ Usr: mcar = {Ncar , bs′usrc64}, scar = MAC(Kses ,mcar )
3. Usr→ Car: s′′usr = MAC(Kses , scar )
FIGURE 7. Protocol procedures for execution and on-the-fly execution
authenticated by a MAC in scar . Finally, the user answers to
this challenge with s′′usr which is a MAC computed on the
previous message with the session key Kses .
We do not present additional procedures for rights re-
vocation. All of the included asymmetric primitives have
well-known revocation mechanisms. This includes the group
signature in [10] for which the procedure is less obvious.
While deploying such revocation mechanisms is not straight-
forward, e.g., the car needs to keep a revocation list and
update it accordingly, adding more details here is out of scope
for our work. We also do not insist on other technicalities
such as how to revoke owners or how to facilitate the resale
of the car since adding protocol fragments is easy for any
such action but will contribute little to the main concept from
this work.
D. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY ARGUMENTS
As adversary model, we consider the general Dolev-Yao
[21] intruder that has full control over the communication
channel, i.e., he can eavesdrop, replay, inject or modify
existing packets. Specific attacks related to the software
implementation are out of scope for the current analysis. But
as for future, more practical embodiments of our work, the
use of specific Android security mechanisms or relying on
hardware security, e.g., TPM 2.0 functions, may be projected.
Since we rely on existing cryptographic blocks that are
assumed to be secure, rather than deriving more complicate
cryptographic proofs, we consider that a proof by formal
analysis (model-checking) offers better support for the secu-
rity of our protocol. We choose to rely on the IF language
for modelling which is the base language for the three
model-checkers of the AVISPA platform [3]. In particular, we
choose to rely on the CLAtse model-checker [55] from the
AVISPA platform. Model-checkers assume the underlying
cryptographic blocks to be perfect and model the intruder
as a Dolev-Yao adversary. For brevity, we choose to model
the last 2 protocol fragments V) and VI), i.e., execute (by
persistent or ephemeral role) and execute on-the-fly (by ses-
sion key) since these are the actual protocol components that
grant access to the car. Modelling the entire protocol would
require a large amount of work and would be out-of-scope
for the technological readiness level that we target in the
current work, i.e., proof-of-concept. By using the IF language
of the AVISPA platform [3], we model each protocol step as
a transition from the left-hand side (LHS) facts to the right-
hand side (RHS) facts. The LHS and RHS are conjunctions
of positive and negative facts and are not persistent (the RHS
suppresses the LHS). The Dolev-Yao adversary is modelled
by the iknows predicate which cumulates facts in a persistent
manner, i.e., the intruder never forgets what he learns.
The first model that we analyze is the simple on-the-fly
execution. We defined two actions, i.e., open car and start
car, and ask the model checker if it can produce a trace that
can trigger a start of the car given that the honest user is
set to open the car. This covers the scenario in which the
adversary can manipulate the commands of the genuine user.
The model-checker answered that the protocol is safe. To test
the correctness of our model we also added the session key
Kses to the intruder knowledge a case in which the model-
checker immediately returned the attack (this proves that if
the session key would have been leaked by any mean, the
intruder would have been able to start the car). We also
checked the consistency of the model by verifying that the
genuine user can set the car in the open open state which
proved to be correct.
Figure 8 shows the trace output by the model-checker
when we tested that the genuine user can open the car (in case
of the adversary attack, there is no trace since an attack can-
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i -> (car,4): pair()
(car,4) -> i: pair(n4(NC),
pair(scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open)),
scrypt(kses,pair(n4(NC),
scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open))))))
& Remove state_car(0,usr,sid,kses,open,nc);
& Add state_car(1,usr,sid,kses,open,n4(NC));
& Built from trans2
i -> (usr,3): pair()
(usr,3) -> i: pair(sid,pair(scrypt(kses,open),
scrypt(kses,pair(sid,scrypt(kses,open)))))
& Remove state_usr(0,usr,sid,kses,open,nc);
& Add state_usr(1,usr,sid,kses,open,nc);
& Built from trans1
i -> (usr,5): pair(scrypt(kses,pair(n4(NC),
scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open)))),
pair(n4(NC),scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open))))
(usr,5) -> i: scrypt(kses,scrypt(kses,pair(n4(NC),
scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open)))))
& Remove state_usr(1,usr,sid,kses,open,nc);
& Add state_usr(2,usr,sid,kses,open,n4(NC));
& Built from trans3
i -> (car,6): scrypt(kses,scrypt(kses,pair(n4(NC),
scrypt(kses,pair(sid,open)))))
(car,6) -> i: pair()
& Remove state_car(1,usr,sid,kses,open,n4(NC));
& Add state_car(2,usr,sid,kses,open,n4(NC));
& Built from trans4
FIGURE 8. Output trace for regular user connection to the car
not be found and the model is reported as safe). The output
trace shows that the intruder i mediates the communication
channel by intercepting all messages. Compound messages
are built with the pair operator and symmetric encryption is
modeled by the scrypt predicate. Finally, the car reaches the
state state_car(2,usr,sid,kses,open,n4(NC)) which means that
the user usr managed to open the car under session key kses
and a random challenge nonce n4(NC) which is generated as
a fresh symbolic term by the model checker.
We then proceed to the analysis of the execute procedure
by persistent or ephemeral roles. The AVISPA toolset does
not offer specific support for identity-based signatures or
group signatures but formally speaking they do not differ
in terms of the signing/verification procedures from regular
signatures (the differences are in how the keys are derived
and linked to an identity). In the IF language, a signature
is modelled as encryption with the inverse of the public-key
(similar to the RSA mechanism). For example, the response
of the car in step 2 of protocol v) is symbolically ex-
pressed as iknows(crypt(inv(PkCar), pair(PkCarE, pair(NC,
pair(SID , crypt(inv(PkUsr), pair(NU, pair(Role, Atr)))))))).
Here, crypt(inv(PkCar),_) denotes the signature of the car on
the message. We conducted similar tests as in the case of the
on-the-fly procedure and the protocol proved to be safe.
Another type of attack at the protocol level that is worth
considering is privilege escalation by which an attacker with
certain privileges may try to perform an operation which he
is not entitled to perform. This may include a manufacturer
that tries to de-anonymize the users or a passenger that tries
to achieve driver rights on the car. The only possibility to
de-anonymize users is by using the traceability functionality
of the signature designed by Boneh et al. [10] which would
require access to the group manager secret key. Our imple-
mentation delegates this capability to the car owner, empha-
sizing on the ownership rights (other implementations may
delegate this to a trusted authority). Currently, the scheme of
Boneh et al. [10] is considered secure, so it would be out-of-
scope for this work to bring a new proof that an adversary
may not perform this attack. The same remark is available
for the suggested privilege escalation by a passenger as he
will not be able to generate a signature for a role with higher
privileges as long as the group signature scheme is secure.
There are of course many other side-channels from which
the identity of drivers may be inferred. For example, driving
patterns such as driving time or specific driving behaviors
that can be recorded from on-device sensors can be used
to infer the driver’s identity. Recent research has proved
that accelerometer data can be used for this purpose, e.g.,
[57], [22], [44]. It is however out-of-scope for the current
research to address all these possible leakages as our work is
focused on protocol design and implementation only. For a
fully secure solution, one will need Android devices to offer
resilience to such leakages.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we discuss experimental results on Android
phones and Infotainment units as well as on automotive-
grade controllers. We discuss both computational require-
ments for some of the cryptographic primitives that we
use as well as the protocol running time for several of the
procedures that we previously described.
A. ANDROID AND VEHICLE ON-BOARD UNIT
IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 9 depicts the experimental setup with the after-market
Android headunits on which we deployed our implementa-
tion.
We have implemented in Android Studio the last three
procedures of our protocol: persistent and ephemeral delega-
tion, execute and execute on-the-fly. We tried to keep our im-
plementation as simple and scalable as possible. Therefore,
the protocol implementation relies on a simple finite state
machine. The state machine consists of three states for each
of the execute and execute on-the-fly procedure, and of four
states for the delegation procedure, adhering to the previous
formal protocol description. The states correspond to the
messages that are exchanged during the procedures. For the
group signature scheme we have used the Pairings_in_C
library 3 [56]. The library also contains an Android Demo
that implements the group signature by Boneh et al. [10],
which was easily adapted and integrated in our protocol.
The identity-based signature scheme used in our protocol
3https://github.com/IAIK/pairings_in_c
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FIGURE 9. Android headunits from our experiments
was independently implemented by us, while the rest of the
cryptographic functions are from standard Java libraries.
For the NFC communication, we have used the NFC card
reader and NFC card emulation modes. As basis for our
NFC implementation we used various samples from Android
CardReader and Android CardEmulation Sample provided
by Google 4. The payload size of the NFC frames that were
transmitted between the device running in card reader mode
and the device running in card emulation mode was 254
bytes. Hence, the messages exchanged in the implemented
procedures were divided in several NFC frames.
Wi-Fi communication is based on TCP IP and we used two
sockets, a server socket that listens the incoming connections
requests and a client socket that initializes the connection.
In our application, the smartphone is configured as a client
and the head unit is configured as a server. The headunit also
plays the role of the access point and mobile-phones connect
directly to it.
For our experimental evaluation the on-board unit is rep-
resented by the TC297 microcontroller clocked at 300MHz
and equipped with 8MB of flash and 728KB of RAM. We
evaluated the computational performance of the TC297 by
measuring the execution time for the basic building blocks
of our protocol. We base our implementations on the Mir-
acl (Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic Crypto-
graphic Library) library 5.
B. RESULTS
The computational time of the required cryptographic prim-
itives on several platforms is summarized in Table 4. The
Shamir and GQ signature implementation was developed by
us in C++ and Java for the Infineon controller and Android
devices. The rest of the cryptographic functions come from
the aforementioned libraries.
On the Android devices, the computational time for the
Group Signature (GS) is the highest along with the 2048-bit
4https://github.com/googlesamples/
5https://github.com/miracl/MIRACL
version of the GQ signature and tops between 250-500ms.
For the GQ signature, it may be that our implementation can
be further optimized but the speed difference is clearly in
favour of using Shamir IBS. For setting the security param-
eters of the Shamir signature, we followed the recommenda-
tions in [8] which point to a 1024-bit modulus with a 160-
bit hash functions, which we extend to a 2048-bit modulus
with a 256-bit hash function that should be appropriate for
current needs. For the Tricore in-vehicle unit the execution
time becomes unacceptable with the 2048-bit version of GQ
and since a 1024-bit modulus would lower the security level
we find that using Shamir IBS is the only viable option.
The cryptographic libraries that we use on Infineon had no
platform-specific optimizations. The GS and the 2048-bit
version of GQ have similar run-times on Android while there
is a bigger computational gap between the two when exe-
cuted on the Infineon controller. This suggests that the C++
code for the Infineon platform can be further optimized to
obtain similar performances. As the IBS and GS are used less
often, the protocol should cope for a real-world car access
scenario. We assume that the on-the-fly execution, which
relies only on symmetric-key cryptography is the regular way
to access the car while the identity/group-based execution is
only triggered once to establish a session key. The RSA has a
shorter runtime than the GS and GQ, but of course these tradi-
tional building blocks do not offer the advantages of group or
identity-based signatures. We also include results regarding
ECDH, the time to generate the key-pair (a, aP ) denoted as
GenKP and the time to generate the secret key abP denoted
as GenSK, to serve as a comparison to RSA. For this purpose
we use regular Android cryptographic libraries from Spongy
Castle, while for the Infineon controller we consider results
from our previous work in [47]. The runtime is in general
comparable with that of the RSA, though not surprising RSA
encryption is still the fastest. On the embedded controller the
results for RSA were somewhat poorer and given the larger
key size it becomes somewhat clear that ECDH would be
more suitable in this case.
In Table 5 we summarize the complete run-time for several
protocol procedures run between smartphones and head-
units. These protocol fragments are tested over the three
interfaces NFC, Bluetooth and WiFi. Since our car head-units
did not support regular data transfer over Bluetooth, in this
case we tested the execution only between two smartphones.
However, the performance should be close to the case when
a head-unit is used. Sharing rights is done over NFC due to
increased security as it works on a shorter range and is harder
to spoof. The request for execution to the car head-unit is
done over WiFi. The execution runtime is around 1 second
(and generally less than 1 second with the more efficient
Shamir IBS), which should be sufficiently fast, assuming
that only the first execution is done with the slower group
or identity-based signatures. The rest of the executions are
carried by the on-the-fly procedure taking only a few hundred
milliseconds (since a common secret shared key exists).
Figure 10 summarizes in a graphic form on some of the
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TABLE 4. Computational time for cryptographic primitives on selected platforms (ms)
`````````Device
Primitive GS (254 bit) Shamir (2048 bit) GQ (2048 bit) ECDH (192 bit) ECDH (256 bit) RSA (2048 bit)
Sign Ver Sign Ver Sign Ver GenKP GenSK GenKP GenSK Enc Dec
LG Optimus P700 259.21 364.35 49.26 46.49 218.50 424.80 49.66 26.39 83.96 56.88 2.15 52.59
Samsung S7 24.12 33.15 7.79 8.02 27.72 57.18 15.15 13.81 46.37 15.17 0.24 8.80
Samsung J5 SM-J500F 158.73 226.71 18.31 16.21 70.76 139.12 13.58 5.95 20.17 10.39 0.60 17.07
Samsung S5 68.09 96.54 23.26 22.59 102.98 203.25 17.65 8.57 27.86 15.08 0.78 24.91
Headunit 1(Erisin) 181.39 261.60 28.20 25.47 113.10 220.30 14.68 6.44 20.35 10.43 0.97 26.86
Headunit 2(PNI) 176.33 254.08 27.35 24.70 111.60 218.70 14.23 6.24 19.73 10.11 0.96 26.28
Tricore Tc297 511.60 745.60 448.00 448.00 2000.00 4120.00 36.40 37.40 59.80 69.10 26.00 462.00
TABLE 5. Computational/communication time for protocol procedures (ms)
Devices Com. Execute Persistent Execute Ephemeral Exec. Delegate Persistent Delegate EphemeralShamir IBS GQ IBS Shamir IBS GQ IBS OTF Shamir IBS GQ IBS Shamir IBS GQ IBS
Phone2Phone(S5-S7) NFC – – – – – 998.64 1256.42 1165.64 1423.42
S7-Headunit 1(Erisin) WiFi 758.48 892.55 923.87 1272.70 516.00 – – – –
S7-Headunit 2(PNI) WiFi 718.50 851.92 1127.15 1474.49 451.00 – – – –
Phone2Phone (S5-S7) BT 366.83 567.42 193.94 523.42 115.00 – – – –
J5-Headunit 1(Erisin) WiFi 771.85 1019.13 748.63 1203.72 381.80 – – – –
J5-Headunit 2(PNI) WiFi 758.65 965.81 668.01 1121.61 274.50 – – – –
(i) (ii)
(iii) (iv)
FIGURE 10. Execution time for: signatures on the ERISIN headunit (i) and
Infineon Tricore in-vehicle board (ii), execute persistent/ephemeral (Shamir
IBS) J5-Headunit 1(ERISIN) over WiFi (iii) and delegate (Shamir IBS) S5-S7
over NFC (iv)
computational times from Tables 4 and 5.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increased computational power of modern smartphones
and their generous user-interface facilitates the implementa-
tion of various car access control functionalities and more
exquisite protocols with advanced functionalities. These can
benefit from state-of-the-art cryptographic building blocks
such as identity-based cryptography or group signatures.
While some of these require more computational power or
build upon more expensive pairing-friendly elliptical curves,
computational capabilities of modern smartphones and of
high-end in-vehicle units are satisfactory for handling them.
The provided experimental results prove that adoption is
possible both on modern smartphones as well as on modern
in-vehicle controllers, e.g., an Infineon TriCore car controller.
At a minimum, the RBAC access control policy for car
functionalities is within reach for most of the in-vehicle
units on the market. With this research we hope to pave
the way for addressing both security and privacy in car
access control scenarios. Further improvements may consist
in adding specialized hardware such as Trusted Platform
Modules (TPM) or relying on trusted execution environment
such as ARM TrustZone that already exists on some mo-
bile phones. Nonetheless, porting functionalities to wearable
devices such as smart-watches or smart-glasses may also
increase the usability of the solution. We leave these as
potential directions for future works.
REFERENCES
[1] M. A. Albahar, K. Haataja, and P. Toivanen. Bluetooth mitm vulnerabil-
ities: a literature review, novel attack scenarios, novel countermeasures,
and lessons learned. International Journal on Information Technologies &
Security, 8(4), 2016.
[2] G. Alli, L. Baresi, A. Bianchessi, G. Cugola, A. Margara, A. Morzenti,
C. Ongini, E. Panigati, M. Rossi, S. Rotondi, et al. Green move: towards
next generation sustainable smartphone-based vehicle sharing. In Sus-
tainable Internet and ICT for Sustainability (SustainIT), 2012, pages 1–5.
IEEE, 2012.
[3] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, J. Cuéllar,
P. H. Drielsma, P.-C. Héam, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani, et al. The
avispa tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and
applications. In International conference on computer aided verification,
pages 281–285. Springer, 2005.
[4] AUTOSAR. Specification of Crypto Abstraction Library, 4.2.2 edition,
2015.
[5] AUTOSAR. Specification of Crypto Service Manager, 4.2.2 edition, 2015.
[6] L. Bauer, L. Cranor, R. W Reeder, M. Reiter, and K. Vaniea. Comparing
access-control technologies: A study of keys and smartphones. 2007.
[7] L. Bauer, L. F. Cranor, M. K. Reiter, and K. Vaniea. Lessons learned from
VOLUME , 2020 15
Groza et al.: PRESTvO: PRivacy Enabled Smartphone based access To vehicle On-board units
the deployment of a smartphone-based access-control system. In SOUPS,
2007.
[8] M. Bellare and G. Neven. Identity-based multi-signatures from rsa.
In CryptographersâA˘Z´ Track at the RSA Conference, pages 145–162.
Springer, 2007.
[9] E. Biham and L. Neumann. Breaking the bluetooth pairing - the fixed
coordinate invalid curve attack. In K. G. Paterson and D. Stebila,
editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2019 - 26th International
Conference, Waterloo, ON, Canada, August 12-16, 2019, Revised Selected
Papers, volume 11959 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 250–
273. Springer, 2019.
[10] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and H. Shacham. Short group signatures. In Annual
International Cryptology Conference, pages 41–55. Springer, 2004.
[11] R. Bose, J. Brakensiek, K.-Y. Park, and J. Lester. Morphing smartphones
into automotive application platforms. Computer, 44(5):53–61, 2011.
[12] C. Busold, A. Taha, C. Wachsmann, A. Dmitrienko, H. Seudié, M. Sob-
hani, and A.-R. Sadeghi. Smart keys for cyber-cars: secure smartphone-
based nfc-enabled car immobilizer. In Proceedings of the third ACM
conference on Data and application security and privacy, pages 233–242.
ACM, 2013.
[13] D. Chadwick, A. Otenko, and E. Ball. Role-based access control with x.
509 attribute certificates. IEEE Internet Computing, 7(2):62–69, 2003.
[14] S. Chakraborty and I. Ray. Trustbac: integrating trust relationships into
the rbac model for access control in open systems. In Proceedings of the
eleventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies,
pages 49–58. ACM, 2006.
[15] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham, S. Sav-
age, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, T. Kohno, et al. Comprehensive
experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces. In USENIX Security
Symposium. San Francisco, 2011.
[16] S. Chen, J. Hu, Y. Shi, Y. Peng, J. Fang, R. Zhao, and L. Zhao. Vehicle-
to-everything (v2x) services supported by lte-based systems and 5g. IEEE
Communications Standards Magazine, 1(2):70–76, 2017.
[17] M. L. Damiani, E. Bertino, B. Catania, and P. Perlasca. Geo-rbac: a
spatially aware rbac. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), 10(1):2, 2007.
[18] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[19] A. Dmitrienko and C. Plappert. Secure free-floating car sharing for offline
cars. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy, pages 349–360. ACM, 2017.
[20] A. Dmitrienko, A.-R. Sadeghi, S. Tamrakar, and C. Wachsmann. Smartto-
kens: Delegable access control with nfc-enabled smartphones. In Interna-
tional Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, pages 219–238.
Springer, 2012.
[21] D. Dolev and A. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE
Transactions on information theory, 29(2):198–208, 1983.
[22] M. Enev, A. Takakuwa, K. Koscher, and T. Kohno. Automobile driver fin-
gerprinting. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2016(1):34–
50, 2016.
[23] D. F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn, and R. Chandramouli.
Proposed nist standard for role-based access control. ACM Transactions
on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 4(3):224–274, 2001.
[24] A. Francillon, B. Danev, S. Capkun, S. Capkun, and S. Capkun. Relay
attacks on passive keyless entry and start systems in modern cars. In
NDSS, 2011.
[25] L. Francis, G. Hancke, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis. Practical nfc
peer-to-peer relay attack using mobile phones. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and
Privacy Issues, pages 35–49. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[26] F. D. Garcia, D. Oswald, T. Kasper, and P. Pavlidès. Lock it and still lose
itâA˘Tˇon the (in) security of automotive remote keyless entry systems. In
25th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 16), 2016.
[27] R. Garra, S. Martinez, and F. Sebe. A privacy-preserving pay-by-phone
parking system. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 66(7):5697–
5706, 2017.
[28] D. Giese, K. Liu, M. Sun, T. Syed, and L. Zhang. Security analysis of near-
field communication (NFC) payments. CoRR, abs/1904.10623, 2019.
[29] B. Groza, T. Andreica, and P.-S. Murvay. Designing wireless automotive
keys with rights sharing capabilities on the msp430 microcontroller. In
Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Veh. Technol. Intell. Trans. Syst., pages 173–180.
[30] L. C. Guillou and J.-J. Quisquater. A âA˘IJparadoxicalâA˘I˙ identity-based
signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Proceedings on
Advances in cryptology, pages 216–231. Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[31] L. C. Guillou, M. Ugon, and J.-J. Quisquater. Cryptographic authentication
protocols for smart cards. Computer Networks, 36(4):437–451, 2001.
[32] J. Han, Y.-H. Lin, A. Perrig, and F. Bai. Mvsec: Secure and easy-to-use
pairing of mobile devices with vehicles (cmu-cylab-14-006). 2014.
[33] S. S. Hassan, S. D. Bibon, M. S. Hossain, and M. Atiquzzaman. Security
threats in bluetooth technology. Computers & Security, 74:308–322, 2018.
[34] Y.-S. Huang and C.-H. Lung. Device with identity verificationâA˘Tˇapply
in car driving as an example. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on
Applied System Invention (ICASI), pages 243–246. IEEE, 2018.
[35] J. Isaak and M. J. Hanna. User data privacy: Facebook, cambridge
analytica, and privacy protection. Computer, 51(8):56–59, 2018.
[36] ISO. ISO/IEC 14888-2:2008 Information technology, Security techniques,
Digital signatures with appendix, 2 edition, 2008.
[37] T. Kasper, A. KÃijhn, D. Oswald, C. Zenger, and C. Paar. Rights
management with nfc smartphones and electronic id cards: A proof of
concept for modern car sharing. In Radio Frequency Identification, pages
34–53. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[38] E. Kiltz and G. Neven. Identity-based cryptography. 2, 2009.
[39] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel, T. Kohno, S. Checkoway,
D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham, et al. Experimental
security analysis of a modern automobile. In Security and Privacy (SP),
2010 IEEE Symposium on, pages 447–462. IEEE, 2010.
[40] D. R. Kuhn, E. J. Coyne, and T. R. Weil. Adding attributes to role-based
access control. Computer, 43(6):79–81, 2010.
[41] C. Lai, R. Lu, D. Zheng, and X. S. Shen. Security and privacy challenges
in 5g-enabled vehicular networks. IEEE Network, 34(2):37–45, 2020.
[42] K. Lemke-Rust, A.-R. Sadeghi, and C. Stüble. An open approach for
designing secure electronic immobilizers. In Information Security Practice
and Experience, pages 230–242. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
[43] Z. Li, Q. Pei, I. Markwood, Y. Liu, M. Pan, and H. Li. Location privacy
violation via gps-agnostic smart phone car tracking. IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology, 67(6):5042–5053, 2018.
[44] Z. Li, K. Zhang, B. Chen, Y. Dong, and L. Zhang. Driver identification
in intelligent vehicle systems using machine learning algorithms. IET
Intelligent Transport Systems, 13(1):40–47, 2018.
[45] C. Miller and C. Valasek. A survey of remote automotive attack surfaces.
Black Hat USA, 2014.
[46] M. Muhammad and G. A. Safdar. Survey on existing authentication issues
for cellular-assisted v2x communication. Vehicular Communications,
12:50–65, 2018.
[47] L. Popa, B. Groza, and P.-S. Murvay. Performance evaluation of elliptic
curve libraries on automotive-grade microcontrollers. In Proceedings of
the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security,
pages 1–7, 2019.
[48] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM,
21(2):120–126, 1978.
[49] A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In
Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques,
pages 47–53. Springer, 1984.
[50] R. Steffen, J. Preißinger, T. Schöllermann, A. Müller, and I. Schnabel. Near
field communication (nfc) in an automotive environment. In Near Field
Communication (NFC), 2010 Second International Workshop on, pages
15–20. IEEE, 2010.
[51] X. Sun, S. Hu, L. Su, T. F. Abdelzaher, P. Hui, W. Zheng, H. Liu, and J. A.
Stankovic. Participatory sensing meets opportunistic sharing: Automatic
phone-to-phone communication in vehicles. IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, 15(10):2550–2563, 2016.
[52] I. Symeonidis, A. Aly, M. A. Mustafa, B. Mennink, S. Dhooghe, and
B. Preneel. Sepcar: A secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access
provision. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
pages 475–493. Springer, 2017.
[53] S. Tillich and M. Wójcik. Security analysis of an open car immobilizer
protocol stack. In Trusted Systems, pages 83–94. Springer, 2012.
[54] J. Timpner, D. Schürmann, and L. Wolf. Secure smartphone-based
registration and key deployment for vehicle-to-cloud communications. In
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on Security, privacy & depend-
ability for cyber vehicles, pages 31–36. ACM, 2013.
[55] M. Turuani. The cl-atse protocol analyser. In Intl. Conf. on Rewriting
Techniques and Applications, pages 277–286. Springer, 2006.
[56] T. Unterluggauer and E. Wenger. Efficient pairings and ecc for embedded
systems. In International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems, pages 298–315. Springer, 2014.
16 VOLUME , 2020
Groza et al.: PRESTvO: PRivacy Enabled Smartphone based access To vehicle On-board units
[57] M. Van Ly, S. Martin, and M. M. Trivedi. Driver classification and driving
style recognition using inertial sensors. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium
(IV), 2013 IEEE, pages 1040–1045. IEEE, 2013.
[58] M. Vanhoef and F. Piessens. Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce
reuse in WPA2. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2017.
[59] R. Verdult, F. D. Garcia, and J. Balasch. Gone in 360 seconds: Hijacking
with hitag2. In Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security
symposium, pages 37–37. USENIX Association, 2012.
[60] R. Verdult and F. Kooman. Practical attacks on nfc enabled cell phones. In
2011 Third International Workshop on Near Field Communication, pages
77–82. IEEE, 2011.
[61] W. Webb. Wireless communications: The future. John Wiley & Sons,
2007.
[62] Z. Wei, Y. Yanjiang, Y. Wu, J. Weng, and R. H. Deng. Hibs-ksharing:
Hierarchical identity-based signature key sharing for automotive. IEEE
Access, 5:16314–16323, 2017.
[63] J. Wetzels. Broken keys to the kingdom: Security and privacy aspects of
rfid-based car keys. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.7424, 2014.
[64] L. Wouters, E. Marin, T. Ashur, B. Gierlichs, and B. Preneel. Fast, furious
and insecure: Passive keyless entry and start systems in modern supercars.
IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems,
pages 66–85, 2019.
[65] Y. Zou, A. H. Mhaidli, A. McCall, and F. Schaub. I’ve Got Nothing to
Lose: Consumers’ risk perceptions and protective actions after the equifax
data breach. In Fourteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS 2018), pages 197–216, 2018.
APPENDIX A - DESCRIPTION OF THE SHAMIR AND
GUILLOU-QUISQUATER IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURE
SCHEMES
Since the native Android cryptographic libraries offer no sup-
port for the Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater identity-based
signature schemes, we had to implement these separately (the
source-code will be maintained on our project website). To
clarify the algorithms we give their description in the syntax
introduced in Section II.B.
The identity-based signature scheme proposed by Shamir
[49] consists in the following four algorithms:
1) Setup(k) is the key setup algorithm which outputs the
master secret key msk and the global parameters pk. For
this, it generates two random primes p, q of k bits in
length, computes n = pq, φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), sets
integer e ∈ Zφ(n) s.t. gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 then computes
d = e−1 mod φ(n). The master secret key is msk =
{n, d} and the global public key is pk = {n, e, h}. Here
h stands for a hash function that maps the user name to
an element of Zφ(n), i.e., h : {0, 1}∗ → Zφ(n).
2) KeyDer(msk, I) uses the master secret key msk and the
identity of the user I to output the private key of the
user. For this, it computes h(I)d mod n and returns to
each user the secret key sk = {h(I)d mod n, n} (the
public key of each user is his identity, i.e., I).
3) Sign(sk,m) is the signature generation algorithm which
uses the secret key sk on the messagem to return the sig-
nature σ. For this, it selects random r ∈ Zn, computes
t = re mod n, then the hash of t concatenated with
message m, i.e., h = hash(t||m), then s = h(I)drh
mod n. The signature is σ = {s, t}.
4) Ver(pk, I,m, σ) takes as input the system global param-
eters pk, the identity of the user I , the message m and
the signature σ. To verify that the signature is correct
the algorithm computes se then checks if this is equal to
h(I)th mod n and returns true if so or ⊥ otherwise.
The Guillou-Quisquater [30] identity-based signature
scheme is a collection of four algorithms:
1) Setup(k) is the key setup algorithm that generates the
master secret key msk and the public key pk. In case
of the GQ algorithm, the Setup algorithm, generates
two random primes p, q, each having k bits in length,
it selects random integer v ∈ Zn, n = pq, computes
φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) and v−1 mod φ(n). The master
secret key ismsk = {n, v−1 mod φ(n)} and the public
key is pk = {n, v}.
2) KeyDer(msk, I) is the key derivation algorithm that
uses the master secret key msk and the identity of the
user I to generate his private key. In case of the GQ
algorithm, the identity I of a principal is mapped (by
a publicly known redundancy function) to a number
J ∈ Zn then the algorithm computes B = J−v−1
mod n. The user secret key is sk = {B, J, v, n} (since
this is an identity-based scheme, the public key to verify
the signatures of this user is pk and the identity of the
user I).
3) Sign(sk,m) is the signature algorithm that takes as input
the user’s secret key sk and a messagem then returns the
signature σ. The GQ signing algorithm selects a random
r ∈ Zn, computes T = rvmodn, the hash of message
m denoted as h, then d = JhT v
l
mod n and t = rBd
mod n where l is an integer such that vl < m < vl+1.
The signature is σ = {d, t}.
4) Ver(pk,m, σ) is the verification algorithm which takes
as input the public-key pk, the message m and the
signature σ and returns true if the signature is correct
otherwise it returns ⊥. To verify that the signature is
correct, the algorithm derives J from the identity I ,
computes T ′ = JdT v mod n, computes the hash h of
messages m and d′ = JhT ′v
l
mod n, then the verifier
d′′ = Jh+dv
l
tv
l+1
mod n and checks if d′ = d′′ then
returns true if so or ⊥ otherwise.
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